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ARTICLE

THE DIGNITY CLAUSE OF THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION:
MAY FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE LEAD THE WAY
TO AN EXPANDED INTERPRETATION?
Heinz Klug*

INTRODUCTION

Constitutional language is rarely superfluous. While some
clauses may temporarily lie dormant, it is only a matter of time
before they will be pressed into service. Although there have
been increasing attempts to use the explicit protection of human
dignity in the Montana Constitution, thus far there is little
authoritative guidance as to its scope or meaning.1 A review of
* Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, Admitted to the California
Bar, Advocate of the High Court of South Africa; B.A. (Hon.), University of Natal
(Durban), 1978; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, 1989; S.J.D., University of WisconsinMadison, Law School, 1997. The author would like to thank his research assistant,
Kathrin Ellermann, and the symposium participants for their comments.
1. See Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning
and Scope of the Montana 'Dignity"Clause with PossibleApplications, 61 MoNT. L. REV.
301, 303 (2000) ("IT]he court has yet to develop the meaning of this clause in any of its
opinions."). The clearest exposition of the meaning of individual dignity is in Armstrong
v. State, in which the Montana Supreme Court applied the right of individual privacy but
noted that the Montana Constitution's "Declaration of Rights encompasses a cohesive set
of principles, carefully drafted and committed to an abstract ideal of just government."
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the comparative jurisprudence in this field provides a number of
alternatives for the development of this clause with different
implications for the scope of rights which may be claimed and
secured in the future. Thus, inclusion of an explicit dignity
clause provides a basis for renewed challenges to criminal
sanctions. Further, it provides a basis for possible claims to a
limited core of socio-economic rights, in addition to providing an
underlying justification for the associated rights of equality,
privacy, and self-determination or personal autonomy.
Before exploring the meaning of the Montana Constitution's
dignity clause, however, it is useful to briefly consider its
origins. Since there is no similar clause in the United States
Constitution, the dignity clause represents a product of the often
overlooked yet dynamic process of state constitution-making
that continued through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
These state constitution-making processes led to the adoption of
more explicit and extensive guarantees of individual rights, such
as the right to privacy in the Californian and other state
constitutions, despite little development of the rights explicitly
guaranteed in the federal Constitution.
While the record of Montana's 1972 constitutional
convention indicates that the drafters may have drawn the
language for the dignity clause from the Puerto Rican
Constitution of 1952,2 it is also important to recognize that the
idea of a right to human dignity had become an explicit part of
post-World War II human rights discourse. 3 Thus, the preamble
to the Charter of the United Nations reaffirmed the member
nations' "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
In addition, dignity was
worth of the human person."4
incorporated as an inherent feature of a "rights bearing human
71, 296 Mont. 361, IT 71, 989 P.2d 485, 71. The Armstrong court then
1999 MT 261,
proceeded to state that respect for the dignity of each individual "demands that people
have for themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic
values of life in general, answering to their own consciences and convictions." Id. 1 72.
Subsequently applying Armstrong in In re Mental Health of K.G.F, the court gave some
concrete expression to the meaning of dignity in pointing to the statutory requirements
that a person in an involuntary commitment hearing has a right to: (1) dress in his or
her own clothes; (2) have a hearing held in court, not in a mental health facility; and (3)
be present in any hearing or trial. 2001 MT 140, 1 46, 306 Mont. 1, t 46, 29 P.3d 485, 91
46.
2. Clifford & Huff, supra note 1, at 320.
3. See generally THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
(David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
4. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
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subject" in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
5
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.
Subsequently, dignity was adopted as a fundamental right in
the German Basic Law of 1949.6 This trend continued in Puerto
Rico's constitutional dignity provision in 1952, 7 and most
recently, in South Africa's post-apartheid constitutions of 1994
and 1996.8
In contrast to the Montana experience, these other
jurisdictions have developed an active "dignity" jurisprudence.
Seeing Montana's dignity clause in this perspective provides an
opportunity to consider what potential this clause may have in
addressing issues which will potentially come before the courts
in Montana. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge
that the scope of the constitutional right to dignity varies
greatly between these different jurisdictions, and any future
application in Montana will be driven as much by political,
social, and even legal circumstances in the state as by the
seemingly parallel words contained in clauses around the globe.
Significantly, while human dignity is recognized as the
source of human rights in the preambles of both International
Covenants 9 adopted by the United Nations in 1966 to implement
the Universal Declaration, there was no explicit recognition of
an individual right to dignity. Rather, the Covenants and other
international instruments, such as the American Convention on
Human Rights of 196910 and the African Charter on Human and

5.
UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., pmbl., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
6. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1, § 1 (F.R.G.), reprinted in DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 30-33 (2d ed. 1997).
7. P. R. CONST. art. II, § 1. Public Law 447, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (July 3, 1952),
reprintedin 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. 138-39 (1999).
8. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 3, § 10 [interim constitution, also known as Act 200 of 19931
(commenced Apr. 27, 1994) ("Every person shall have the right to respect for and
protection of his or her dignity."); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 10 [final constitution, also
known as Act 108 of 1996] (adopted May 8, 1996) ("Everyone has inherent dignity and
the right to have their dignity respected and protected.").
9. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, art. 2(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).
10. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, § 2, 9 I.L.M. 673
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
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People's Rights of 1986,11 treat human dignity as what has been
described as the "ur-text" of human rights, as the source of all
other rights.
To throw light on the Montana Constitution's dignity
clause, I will first reflect on what we understand by the idea of
"human dignity." Second, this paper will consider the notion of a
constitutional right to dignity and how this may be
distinguished from the general notion of human dignity as a
source of human rights. This second part of the article will
discuss five different ways in which to understand how the right
to dignity is given constitutional form: as an individual right; as
a background condition of other individually recognized rights;
as a foundational constitutional concept; as a substantive
constitutional right; or finally, as a combination of a substantive
right and an interpretative guide flowing from its foundational
status. I will then focus specifically on the two major ways in
which human dignity has been given constitutional form - as a
foundational guide or an individual substantive right. On one
hand, it is treated as a founding principle, not just as an "urtext" but as the basic principle through which all other rights
are interpreted. On the other hand, human dignity has in some
circumstances been framed as an individual right which may be
directly upheld in the courts. Finally, these perspectives will be
used to briefly reflect on the Montana Constitution's clause and
the opportunities it represents.
UNDERSTANDING THE IDEA OF "HUMAN DIGNITY"

Human dignity may simply be described as a sense of self
worth, and as such, it is commonly understood as the core
principle of the idea of human rights. It is in this sense that
human dignity is claimed to be the "source" of human rights, the
common core that as Kant argued, obligates each of us to
"acknowledge... the dignity of humanity in every other
Less simple is the idea of a constitutionally
[person]. '12
protected right to dignity which may be asserted in specific
factual circumstances and may give rise to specific legal
11. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, art. 5, 21
I.L.M. 59 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
12. IMMANUEL KANT, Doctrine of Virtue, in Part II of THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 132 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1797), cited in Alan
Gerwith, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,
1992).
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remedies.
In the context of United States Constitutional
interpretation, there is little explicit discussion of human
dignity as a legal right. 13 Instead, it is implicitly assumed that
human dignity is guaranteed by the protections already
contained in the Bill of Rights or implicit in the very nature of
the constitutional order. 14 This situation stands in marked
contrast to other constitutions, such as the German and South
African constitutions. In those countries, the right to dignity is
explicitly protected and a jurisprudence of dignity has led to
definitions of rights and conclusions about issues such as the
death penalty 15 and life imprisonment 6 which are quite
different from those reached in the United States.
As a prelude to exploring this jurisprudence, I will briefly
discuss some of the dominant assumptions and tendencies which
pervade our discussions of human dignity as a sense of selfworth or equal worth. First is the assumption, implicit in the
idea that human rights are primarily individual rights, that
human dignity is a purely individual trait. Second is the
tendency to define dignity in mainly negative terms - as a right
the state may not violate rather then as a positive right of the
individual or community which must be upheld or supported. It
is in this latter sense, as a positive right, that a broader
conception of human dignity may be understood as being located
in specific relationships: between individuals; between
individuals and institutions; and especially in relation to the

13. See Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, 'Human Dignity," and Constitutional
Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN
VALUES 296 (Michael J. Meyer & W. A. Parent eds., 1992) (citing Chief Justice Warren's
argument that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man" from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958), and Justice Brennan's
rejection of the death penalty because it "treat[s] members of the human race as
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded... [and is] thus inconsistent with
the fundamental premise of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments] Clause, that even the
vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity" in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., conc.)).
14. See Chisholm v. Georgia, in which Justice James Wilson stated, "A State,
useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his
native dignity derives all its acquired importance." 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793)
(emphasis added). See generally William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human
Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES

(Michael J. Meyer & W. A. Parent eds., 1992).
15. See S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 BCLR 665 (CC). See
generally Heinz Kug, Striking Down Death: S v Makwanyane, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RTS. 61 (1996).
16. Life Imprisonment, 45 BverfGE 187 (1977). See KOMMERS, supra note 6, at
306-311.
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exercise of power, whether it be public or private.
This
conception
relies
on
the
assumption
of
a
basic
interconnectedness, that humans essentially exist at all times as
both individuals and members of communities. An important
element of this approach is the notion that individual dignity is
not only dependent upon membership in a community but also
on the right of access to a minimum level of socio-economic
resources which will allow for the possibility of a dignified
existence.
As much of the jurisprudence is dominated by a negative
definition of individual dignity, I will begin by describing two
examples which exemplify a positive definition of individual
dignity. In this way, I hope to provide an initial sense of
meaning to what are often rather abstract and vague notions
incorporated into the claim of human dignity. Thereafter, I will
discuss the consequences of recognizing the relational or
collective aspects of the idea of human dignity, especially as a
basis for claims to socio-economic and cultural rights.
An exemplary display of individual dignity may be
recognized in Nelson Mandela's speeches from the dock. 17 These
speeches were given at a time before it could be seriously
imagined that he would serve as South Africa's first
democratically-elected President. Acquitted of treason in March
1961 after a trial lasting over four years, Mandela was back in
the dock just over a year later, this time accused and convicted
of inciting people to strike and of leaving the country without a
passport.
When first asked to plead, Mandela, who was
representing himself, explained that he hoped to "be able to
indicate.., that this case is a trial of the aspirations of the
African people."' 8 Making a subsequent application for the
recusal of the magistrate, Mandela, who had previously
practiced law before this same court, now dressed in a
traditional Xhosa leopard-skin kaross instead of a suit and tie,
asked:
Why is it that in this courtroom I am facing a white magistrate,
confronted by a white prosecutor, escorted by white orderlies?
Can anybody honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of
atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced? Why is it
that no African in the history of this country has ever had the
honor of being tried by his own kith and kin, by his own flesh and

17. "Dock" is the term used in South Africa to describe the place in a criminal court
where the accused stands or sits during trial.
18.

NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 283 (1994).
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blood? I will tell your Worship why: the real purpose of this rigid
color bar is to ensure that the justice dispensed by the courts
should conform to the policy of the country, however much that
policy might be in conflict with the norms of justice accepted in
judiciaries throughout the civilized world ....
Your Worship, I
hate racial discrimination most intensely and in all its
manifestations. I have fought it all my life. I will fight it now, and
I will do so until the end of my days. I detest most intensely the
set-up that surrounds me here. It makes me feel that I am a black
man in a white man's court. This should not be. 19

Mandela was again brought into the dock while serving the
five-year prison sentence he had previously received, and once
again, he faced the death penalty. 20 This time, the charges were
sabotage and conspiracy. Mandela opened the case for the
defense with a statement from the dock in which he conceded
that he was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we
Sizwe (the spear of the nation) and had planned sabotage as the
state alleged. In justifying the decision to organize armed
resistance against the apartheid state, Mandela detailed the
"terrible disparities between black and white life in South
Arica ....
[i]n education, health, income, every aspect of
life..." and explained to the court that:
the lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct
result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies
black inferiority.
Legislation designed to preserve white
supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa
are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be
carried or cleaned the white man looks around for an African to do
21
it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not.

Completing his speech to the court Mandela displayed a
degree of personal dignity in stark contrast to the official denial
of dignity inherent in apartheid law and institutions. Speaking
directly to the judge, Mandela spoke what would be his last
public words for nearly twenty-seven years:
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the
African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have
fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a
democratic and free society in which all persons live together in
harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope
to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I
22
am prepared to die.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 283-84.
Mandela first faced the death penalty during the treason trial.
MANDELA, supra note 17, at 321.
Id. at 322.
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Reaching beyond the boundaries of the nation state, this
same sense of individual dignity is captured in the claims made
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his "Four Freedoms"
speech in January 1941. In his speech, Roosevelt committed the
United States to the task of securing a future, not just in the
United States, but everywhere in the world, "founded upon four
essential human freedoms:"
The first is freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the
world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in
his own way - everywhere in the world. The third is freedom
from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy
peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world. The
fourth is freedom from fear, which translated into world terms,
means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in
such a through fashion that no nation will be in a position to
commit an23act of aggression against any neighbor - anywhere in
the world.

Although Roosevelt phrased these rights as attributes of
individual freedom, these claims clearly embrace a second, more
collective notion of human dignity. It is in this sense, then, that
it is possible to see the interaction of an individual notion of
human dignity and the idea of a broader notion of communal or
collective idea of equal worth that requires a more positive
conception of the right.
An example of collective or communal dignity and its
relation to socio-economic and cultural rights 24 is the story of the
creation of the Freedom Charter, 25 the document which
embodied the aspirations of the majority of South Africans
during the struggle against apartheid.
Launched in the
aftermath of the Defiance Campaign, in which thousands of
volunteers across South Africa publically disobeyed unjust
apartheid laws, "the campaign to create the Freedom Charter
raised the positive vision of an alternative, apartheid-free South
Africa." 26 After the 1953 annual congress of the African
National Congress and the creation of a National Action Council
in March 1954, over 10,000 volunteers were mobilized to prepare
23. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms, Message to Congress
(Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.libertynet.org/-edcivic/fdr.html
24. See generally DIGNITY AND HuMAN RIGHTS: THE IMPLEMENTATATION OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Berma K. Goldewijk, Adalid C. Baspineiro,
& Paulo C. Carbonari eds. 2002).
25. See generally MARY BENSON, THE AFRICAN PATRIOTS 204-16 (1964).
26. RAYMOND SUTTNER & JEREMY CRONIN, 30 YEARS OF THE FREEDOM CHARTER at
x (1986).
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for a Congress of the People to be held in mid-1955. The yearlong campaign was a series of events, "held in huge rallies, small
houses, flats [apartments], street and factory meetings,
gatherings in kraals and on farms, '27 and produced over one
thousand demands-some written on mere scraps of paper,
28
others formally presented.
Held over two days on a soccer ground in Kliptown outside
Johannesburg, the Congress of the People was described by one
of the delegates as "all rather primitive and very simple, but the
people gave it dignity, the mass of people coming together to
spell out their own freedom charter. '29 There, despite being
surrounded and searched by armed police, over 3,000 delegates
discussed and endorsed their collective vision of the future. The
preamble of the Freedom Charter declares that "South Africa
belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no
government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the
will of the people." 30 In addition to the assertion of democratic
values and promises of equality, the delegates included a series
of socio-economic guarantees - including access to food, health,
employment, education, land and housing - that make it clear
that their vision of human dignity included the basic necessities
of a decent life. It is this collective vision of human dignity that
has now been incorporated into South Africa's post-apartheid
constitution, which includes a broad range of human rights
protections including the promise of justiciable socio-economic
rights.
This notion of an intrinsic link between economic security
and human dignity is reflected too in the idea of a "second bill of
rights" claimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1944
State of the Union address. Arguing that the inalienable
political rights which formed the basis of the American Republic
had "proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of
happiness," he asserted that "true individual freedom cannot
exist without economic security and independence." To make
this possible, he advocated the acceptance of a second Bill of
Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can
be established for all-regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are: The right to a useful and remunerative job...;
27.

Id. at 12.

28.

HELEN JOSEPH, SIDE BY SIDE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HELEN JOSEPH 46

(1986).
29.
30.

Id. at 45.
FREEDOM CHARTER, pmbl. (adopted June 26, 1955).
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The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing
and recreation; The right of every farmer to raise and sell his
products at a return which will given him and his family a
decent living; The right of every businessman, large and small,
to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition
and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; The right of
every family to a decent home; The right to adequate medical
care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; The
right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment; The right to a good
31
education.
As these examples demonstrate, human dignity is not
merely a general philosophical concept or even an individual
attribute, but rather an expression of a sense of being that is
simultaneously personified and imbedded in the relationship
between individuals and their community, as epitomized by
Roosevelt's "four freedoms." In these examples, there are both
explicit references to the dignity of the individual and the
collective - "African people" or "mass of people" - as well as an
inherent dignity in either the speaker or the product of the event
- Mandela in the dock or the Freedom Charter itself. Finally,
there is the notion of a dignified human existence with the
prerequisite guarantee of economic security and independence
as suggested by the idea of a "second bill of rights" in the United
States context. Thus, while one aspect of human dignity may be
a sense of individual self worth, expressions of dignity may be
located in a wide variety of situations. The challenge for any
legal protection of dignity is to determine under what conditions
these different elements of human dignity may be recognized,
with an aim, over time, to encompass them all.
A ConstitutionalRight to Dignity?
Given these different but overlapping notions of human
dignity, there are a number of ways to think about the role an
explicit constitutional right to dignity might play. To clarify
these interrelated notions I will discuss them as five distinct
forms of a rights that might be constitutionally recognized: (1) a
classic individual right; (2) a background to other rights; (3) a
foundational right; (4) a distinctly separate and substantive
31. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/projects/presproject
idgrant/sou pages/frooseveltllsu.html.
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right; and (5) a combination of a substantive right and
foundational right.
First, we might treat dignity as a classic individual right.
But what does it mean to constitutionally guarantee the right to
individual dignity? Take the example of Nelson Mandela. Is
there any need, or way, to protect the dignity of such an
individual, who despite extreme adversity insisted upon and
expressed his own inherent dignity?
Yet we are not all
Mandelas. While each individual clearly possesses inherent
dignity, many may be demeaned or have their individual dignity
impaired by the actions of others, whether individuals or
institutions, public or private. Thus there is clearly scope for the
negative protection of individual dignity. However, this is
largely evident in the protection of an individual's reputation,
bodily integrity and right to self-expression, individual rights
protected most commonly through common law torts or other
existing constitutional rights.
While there is a clear connection and at times an overlap of
the rights to individual dignity and privacy, the most important
distinction between the two is the claim that an individual right
to dignity protects the intrinsic worth of the individual and not
merely an inner sphere of autonomous decision-making or
private intimacy. A most dramatic example of this exercise of
the right to individual dignity arose in a German case, in which
it was argued that even if a women stripper in a peep show was
participating voluntarily, the act of stripping before an audience
which she could not see, engage, or interact with amounted to a
violation of her dignity. 32 The court in that case, the Federal
Administrative Tribunal, distinguished regular strip shows on
the grounds that the stripper in such cases could be thought of
as being in a similar position to a dancer or actor who engages
their audience directly. From that perspective, striptease acts
may be seen as a form of self-expression. In contrast, the peep
show striper was not able to see her audience and thus the act of
exposing herself was purely degrading and could therefore be
outlawed as a violation of individual dignity. Although it is
unusual in the United States context to imagine an individual
right which may be imposed on an individual against her will, in
the German context the state has an independent constitutional

32. Peep Show Case (1), 64 BVerfGE 274 (1981) (F.R.G.).
See SABINE
MIcHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
CIL

LIBERTIES 105-07 (1999).
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duty to advance and protect the rights guaranteed in the Basic
Law. 33 Thus, the state is compelled to enforce the right to
individual dignity, even against the objections of those whom
the right is designed to protect. The closest analogy in the
United States context would be prohibitions against voluntary
enslavement, euthanasia, or even assisted suicide.
Second, in contrast to the case of a violation of personal
dignity, we may simply conceive of the right to human dignity as
a general expression, background condition, or source of all the
particular human rights that may be constitutionally
recognized. This seems to be the premise of the notion that the
Freedom Charter was an expression of collective human dignity
in its promise and claim for the recognition of specific human
rights in a future South Africa. This perspective may be
discerned also in the relationship between statements and
claims of human dignity in constitutional conflicts in the United
States and the jurisprudence of rights specifically guaranteed in
the United States Constitution. In its jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court has relegated human dignity "to a
background of extra-constitutional principles. '34 From this
perspective, any particular reference to human dignity merely
describes the general goal to be achieved through the recognition
and upholding of specific rights, whether they be rights to
equality, privacy, or even minimal living conditions. As Clifford
and Huff have shown, in the cases in which the U.S. Supreme
court has invoked "dignity," the Court does not view it as a
constitutional right but rather "assumes that the dignity of
persons is a central, foundational ideal of our political tradition
'35
closely allied to our ideals of liberty and autonomy.
Another way to consider the relationship between a
constitutionalized notion of dignity and other constitutionally
protected rights is to view the notion of human dignity as a
foundational principle. Distinct from the idea of dignity being a
purely background principle or political ideal, in this view the
idea of individual and collective dignity, captured so clearly in
the Freedom Charter, may be seen as informing our
understanding of how all the other protected rights must be
33.

DAVID M. BEATTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE 276 (1994).
34. Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality Rights in
the Constitutional Jurisprudenceof Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 343, 360 (1998).
35.
Clifford & Huff, supra note 1, at 312-313.
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interpreted. Here dignity is not merely the general goal served
by the protection of human rights but rather the lens through
which all protected rights should be interpreted. As former
President of the German Constitutional Court, Ernst Benda, has
noted: "Article 1 [the dignity clause] of the Basic Law ....is
both 'the supreme constitutional principle' and a fundamental
right."36
A fourth approach is to treat the right to dignity as a
separate constitutionally protected right with a substantive
content distinct from other individual or collective rights. The
challenge of this approach is to define those situations in which
the assertion of the right to dignity would serve to guarantee
particular realms of action or inaction or to secure the protection
of, or access to, particular resources. In the German context,
this task is accomplished by recognizing that the right to dignity
in Article 1 exists in a symbiotic relationship with the "general
liberty interests secured by the personality, inviolability, and
"37
right-to-life clauses of Article 2.
Deciding whether a particular claim enjoys constitutional
protection under this rubric requires the courts to distinguish
fundamental rights from the rules and remedies of ordinary law.
In the Forest Law case, which considered whether the
constitutional right to develop one's personality encompasses a
right to ride a bicycle in the forest, Judge Grimm reasoned in his
dissent that:
[b]asic rights distinguish themselves from the multitude of other
rights by the fact that they protect the integrity, autonomy and
communication of the individual in his basic relations. It is
because of this fundamental importance of the subject matter of
their protection for an order which is founded on human dignity
38
that they are elevated above the mass of rights.

This principle enables the court to identify, according to
Judge Grimm, a realm of protected activity lying in a zone
"between the inviolable kernel of the personality on the one
hand and the general freedom of activity on the other, '39 which
is not protected by any enumerated right, yet is "nevertheless of
36. Ernst Benda, The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law), 53
SMU L. REv. 443 (2000).
37. KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 299.
38. Forest Law Case (a.k.a. Rider in the Woods Case), 80 BverfGE 137, 164 (June
6, 1989) (F.R.G.) (Grimm, J., dissenting) (trans. Raymond Youngs) accessed at
www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/tgcm/v890606.htm,
also
available
at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global-law/cases/german/bverfg/bverfg-6junel989.html.
39. Id. at 166.
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considerable importance
for the development of the
personality."40 Applying this analysis to the question of the
right to ride a bicycle in the forest, Judge Grimm stated that the
"development of the personality of the individual does not
depend on the possibility of riding in the forest"4 1 and thus he
rejected the constitutional complaint, not on the grounds that
the majority chose, but rather because the restrictions on riding
in the forest "do not affect the protected area of this basic right
at all. '42 The effect of this approach is to carve out, on a case by
case basis, the specific situations in which a new activity will be
constitutionally protected because the activity falls within the
realm of human dignity but is not protected by other
enumerated rights.
Finally, we may combine two of the above approaches and
argue that the right to dignity is best secured through an
approach that seeks to both identify a particular substantive
content as well as view dignity as the foundational principle for
the interpretation and implementation of the broader human
rights project.
While this approach is inherent in the
43
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany,
it may also be witnessed more broadly in the legal and political
practices of other jurisdictions, including at times the United
States. It was, after all, in the face of human suffering brought
on by the great depression and in the name of human dignity
that President Franklin D. Roosevelt advanced the program for
the New Deal and in time the notion of a second bill of rights.
Similarly, in Goldberg v. Kelly,4 the United States Supreme
Court reached the outer limits of its procedural due process
jurisprudence.
The Court asserted a substantive notion of
dignity in deciding that government welfare benefits reflected a
new form of property without which the recipients could not
sustain a dignified existence. As such, these benefits could not
be removed without due process, including a full evidentiary
hearing.

40.

Id.

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 169.
Id.
See generally KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 298-359; EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY

AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2002).

44.

397 U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Other Goldberg, in THE

CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer

ed., 1992).
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DIGNITY AS A FOUNDING PRINCIPLE

Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law (German Constitution,
1949) states that the "dignity of the human person is inviolable"
and places a duty on all public authority to respect it. The
foundational character of this provision is evident in two ways:
(1) from a consideration of the genesis of the Basic Law which
was drafted and continues to be interpreted in direct response to
the history of National Socialism; 45 and (2) in the prohibition
against any future legal amendment of this provision or other
key sections of the Basic Law guaranteeing the democratic and
federal character of post-war Germany. 46 As the federal
Constitutional Court stated in the Microcensus Case: "Human
dignity is at the very top of the value order of the Basic Law.
This commitment to the dignity of man dominates the spirit of
47
Article 2 (1), as it does all other provisions of the Basic Law."

The essence of this idea is that the basic principles of the
constitutional order are not subject to change, not even to formal
amendment. As the Constitutional Court declared in the Elfes
case, "laws are not constitutional merely because they have been
passed in conformity with procedural provisions. They must be
substantively compatible with the highest values of a free and
democratic order.., and must also conform to unwritten
fundamental constitutional principles.148 This gives rise to the
idea that rights guaranteed in the Basic Law constitute an
"objective system of values '49 guaranteeing the "independence,
self-determination, and dignity of man within the political
community....

[a]bove all, laws must not violate a person's

dignity, which represents the highest value of the Basic
51
Law .... ,"50 Dignity in this context serves as a "counterweight"
when the court is called upon to balance conflicting rights, and
in this objective sense "sets the boundary to liberties flowing
from the rights of personal autonomy.

45.
46.
47.
6, at 299.
48.
317-18.
49.
48.
50.
51.
52.

'52

See Benda, supra note 36, at 445-447.
Art 79 (3) of the Basic Law. See KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 31.
Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969) (F.R.G.), cited in KOMMERS, supranote
Elfes Case, 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957) (F.R.G.), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at
Luth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (F.R.G.), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at
Elfes Case, 6 BVerfGE 32, cited in KOMMERS, supranote 6, at 318.
Pagan, supra note 34, at 351.
KOMMERS, supranote 6, at 359.
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Human dignity also plays a foundational role in South
Africa's post-apartheid constitution.
As the South African
Constitutional Court has noted, the "Constitution asserts
dignity to contradict our past ....[ilt asserts it too to inform the
future, to invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth
of all human beings. '53 There are in fact no less then five
specific references to human dignity in the 1996 Constitution.
First, human dignity, together with "equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms" is one of the
founding provisions contained in section 1. This section may
only be amended by a seventy-five percent majority of the
National Assembly (the legislature) supported by six of the nine
provinces - making it virtually unchangeable. Second, there
are four separate references to human dignity within the bill of
rights: as a key democratic value which the state is obliged to
uphold; 54 as an explicit substantive right; 55 and most
significantly from a foundational perspective, as both a nonderogable right in the event of a state of emergency 56 and as a
factor for the courts to consider in deciding whether a limitation
of a right is reasonable and justifiable. 57 It is the latter role that
is the key, in practice, to the idea of human dignity serving as a
foundational principle.
The boundaries of constitutional rights are "set by the rights
of others and by the legitimate needs of society."5 8 The United
States Supreme Court is often called upon to balance conflicting
rights and uses an increasingly varied range of standards of
review - from rationality review to strict scrutiny - to decide
whether the government may infringe upon a particular right in
furtherance of legitimate public goals. In South Africa, the
"limitations clause" directs that "[tihe rights in the Bill of Rights
may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom .... ,59 Human dignity in this context defines the
type of society against which any infringement of a
constitutional right must be compared. To satisfy this test the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC), 35.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 7(1) (1996).
Id. ch. 2, § 10.
Id. ch. 2, § 37(5)(c) & tbl. of Non-Derogable Rights.
Id. ch. 2, § 36(1).
JOHAN DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 140 (2d ed. 1999).
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1) (1996).
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government must show that the "law in question serves a
constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient
proportionality between the harm done by the law and the
benefits it is designed to achieve. '60 Describing this process, the
Constitutional Court in S v. Bhulwana states that "the Court
places the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing
legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of
the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The
more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more
persuasive the grounds of justification must be.16 1
The foundational status of human dignity means that it
serves also as a background principle in the interpretation and
development of other rights. In this sense there is a close link
between the foundational aspects of human dignity and the
specific right to dignity in both South African and German
jurisprudence. Arguing that the death penalty violates the right
to dignity, Justice O'Regan of the South African Constitutional
Court argued that "the importance of dignity as a founding value
of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised... [t]his
right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that
are specifically entrenched in [the bill of rights] .,62
APPLYING A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO DIGNITY

It is precisely this link between the foundational and/or
background role of the notion of human dignity and the
recognition of a specific constitutional right to dignity that
makes it difficult to disentangle a right to dignity from the
protection of various associated rights. In order to explore the
parameters of the right I will divide the jurisprudence into four
general categories: first, how the right has shaped the outer
limits of acceptable criminal sanctions; second, how the right is
interconnected with the rights to personhood and equality; third,
how the right interacts with the control of information and
speech rights; and finally, whether the right provides a basis for
a claim of access to a core set of social and economic resources
necessary to sustain a dignified existence.
First, in the area of criminal sanctions, the right to dignity
has had its most profound impact. Both in South Africa and
Germany, the right to dignity has been relied upon by the
60.
61.

DE WAAL, supra note 55, at 150.
1996 (2) SALR 388 18 (CC).

62.

S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 1 328 (CC).
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respective constitutional courts to guide the courts' imposition of
limits on the state's ability to punish criminals. While the death
penalty was explicitly precluded in the German Basic Law,6 3 in
South Africa the constitution-making process failed to resolve
this issue and thus it was left to the Constitutional Court to
address the fate of the nearly 400 prisoners on death row at the
time the constitution was adopted. In S v. Makwanyane and
Another,64 the new Constitutional Court's second decision, the
court struck down the death penalty on a number of grounds
including human dignity. The Court's decision addressed the
relationship between dignity and capital punishment in a
number of different ways.
While President of the Court
Chaskalson based his decision on the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment, he cited both Justice Brennan's argument
that "the punishment of death.., treats members of the human
race as nonhumans," 65 and the Canadian Supreme Court's
decision in Kindler v. Canada66 in which a minority of judges
described the death penalty as "the supreme indignity to the
individual, the ultimate corporal punishment, the final and
complete lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable
castration... the ultimate desecration of human dignity. '67 The
South African court subsequently struck down the sentence of
juvenile whipping as cruel, inhuman and degrading, arguing in
part that it is reasonable to expect the state to be "foremost in
upholding those values which are the guiding light of civilised
societies.
Respect for human dignity is one such value;
acknowledging it includes an acceptance by society that.. .'even
the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common
'6 8
human dignity.'
The German Constitutional Court has imposed even greater
restraints on the imposition of criminal sanctions, including the
length of prison terms, by holding in the Life Imprisonment
Case that "the state strikes at the very heart of human dignity if
[it] treats the prisoner without regard to the development of his

63. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 102 (F.R.G.).
64. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
65. Id.
57 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 230 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
66. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
67. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, T 60 (quotingKindler, 2 S.C.R. 779, at it 16263).
68. S v. Williams, 1995 (3) SA 632,
77 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665, T 77 (CC)
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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personality and strips him of all hope of ever earning his
freedom. '69
While this decision did not strike down life
imprisonment as a sentence, it did require the state to "consider
the particular situation of each prisoner in terms of his or her
'70
capacity for rehabilitation and resocialization.
Most recently, the South African Constitutional Court relied
upon its dignity clause, as well as the right to life and the
freedom and security of persons clauses, to strike down an old
apartheid era law which allowed the police and even civilians to
use lethal force in an attempt to arrest someone suspected of a
71
variety of offenses, including many non-violent offenses.
Emphasizing the country's recent history in which the "value of
life and human dignity have been demeaned, '72 the court
emphasized that the "rights to human dignity and life are
entwined. The right to life is more than existence - it is a right
to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity,
human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there
'73
cannot be dignity.
Second, the right to dignity is closely associated (one could
argue symbiotic) with the development of the rights of
personhood and equality. In Germany, the dignity clause has
been closely associated with ideas about the "nature of the
human person and the polity."74 Faced with a conflict between
the artist's right to free expression and the dignity of the artist's
subject, the court in the Mephisto case argued that "[like all
basic rights, the guarantee of liberty [in this case artistic
freedom] ... is based on the Basic Law's image of man as an
autonomous person who develops freely within the social
community."75 The consequence of this approach is that it is
necessary to distinguish simple freedom of action (liberty) from
the "limited protection of human freedom without which man
'76
cannot exist as a spiritual and moral person.
While German jurisprudence has emphasized the socially
embedded nature of personhood and its implications for

69.
70.
71.
SALR 01
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

45 BVerfGE 187 (1977), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 309.
KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 311.
See S v. Walters, 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC), 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (CC), 2002 (28)
(CC).
Id. 1 6 (quoting Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, T 218 (Langa, J.)).
Id. 1 5 (quoting Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391,
326-27 (O'Regan, J.)).
KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 304.
30 BVerfGE 173 (1971), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at 302.
Investment Aid I, 4 BVerfGE 7 (1954), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at244.
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freedom, Justice Ackerman of the South African Constitutional
Court has drawn on the link between dignity and personhood to
emphasize the importance of freedom. In Ferreirav. Levin, he
argued that "human dignity cannot be fully valued or respected
unless individuals are able to develop their humanity.., to
develop his or her unique talents optimally," and concluded that
"[uman dignity has little value without freedom.., to deny
77
people freedom is to deny them their dignity.1
While Ackerman's position was rejected by the majority,
who argued that the right to human dignity will flourish in the
context of the "multiplicity of rights with which it is associated"
in the Bill of Rights, this strain of dignity jurisprudence (in
which the right exists in a symbiotic relationship to other rights)
has really flourished in Germany where the courts have: defined
an intimate sphere of personality allowing an individual to
78
control the portrayal of one's own image and spoken word;
imposed duties on the state to protect the developing life in the
context of allowing restricted access to abortion; 79 and
guaranteed the right to travel outside the country, although not
80
an unconditional right to a passport.
The right to equality has also been enriched through its
interaction with the right to dignity, despite its clearly
independent jurisprudential status.
In striking down the
common law criminalization of sodomy, the South African
Constitutional Court noted that the case illustrated how, "in
particular circumstances, the rights of equality and dignity are
closely related, as are the rights of dignity and privacy."8'
Applying this analysis, the court argued that "U]ust as apartheid
legislation rendered the lives of couples of different racial groups
perpetually at risk, the sodomy offence builds insecurity and
vulnerability into the daily lives of gay men."8 2 Finally, the
court held that, "[tihere can be no doubt that the existence of a
law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men
degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society. As such

77.
Ferreira v. Levin, 1996 (1) SA 984, 49 (CC), 1996 BCLR 1, 49 (CC), 1996 (1)
SALR 984, 1 49 (CC).
78. See Eppler Case, 54 BVerfGE 148 (1980).
79. See Abortion I Case, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975).
80. See Elfes Case, 6 BVerffE 32 (1957).
81. Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6, f
30 (CC), 1998 (1) BCLR 1517, 30 (CC).
82. Id. $ 28.
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8 3
In another
it is a palpable invasion of their dignity .... ,
context the court argued that "unfair discrimination...
principally means treating persons differently in a way which
impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are
84
inherently equal in dignity.1
Third, the right to dignity has intersected quite
dramatically with rights to information and freedom of
expression in both the South African and German cases. In
Germany the court went so far as to suspend a census in order
to decide whether the government has the right to collect
detailed information about the habits of individuals. While
recognizing the government's right to gather certain
information, the court held that the right to personality in
tandem with the right to dignity creates a right to
"informational self-determination," guaranteeing "the right of
the individual to determine for himself whether [the state] may
divulge or use his personal data. '8 5 This right is, however, not
unlimited, as "[elven personal information is a reflection of
social reality and cannot be associated purely with the
individual concerned." Thus the "individual must in principle
[according to the court] accept certain limits on his right to
informational self-determination for reasons of compelling public
86
interest."
If the interaction of dignity and personhood produced a new
right to control personal information in Germany, in South
Africa the right to dignity has rewritten the long established
common law of defamation. The defendants in a defamation suit
- a popular Sunday newspaper - argued for the adoption of the
rule in New York Times v. Sullivan,8 7 which limits the ability of
public figures to claim defamation unless the publisher acted
with 'actual malice.'8 8 Acknowledging that "[fireedom of
expression is integral to a democratic society" as it is
"constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human beings," the
court reasoned that the right to free speech must be "construed

83. Id.
84. Prinsloo v. Van der Linde, 1997 (3) SA 1012, 31 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 759, T
31 (CC), 1997 (3) SALR 1012 31 (CC).
85. Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 6, at
325.
86. Id.
87. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW
(1991).
88. Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (5) SA 401,
40 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771,
40
(CC), 2002 (53) SALR 01, 40 (CC).
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in the context of the other values enshrined .... [i]n particular,
the values of human dignity, freedom and equality." 89 Noting
that the "value of human dignity... values both the personal
sense of self-worth as well as the public's estimation of the
worth or value of an individual," the court rejected the Sullivan
approach and instead asked "whether an appropriate balance
[had been] struck between the protection of freedom of
expression on the one hand, and the value of human dignity on
the other." 90 The court found this balance in a rule adopted by
the Supreme Court of Appeals, which developed the common law
to allow a defamation case to be brought by a public official in
order to protect the individual's dignity, but also to allow a
defense of reasonable publication, in which the publisher only
needs to demonstrate that either the statement was true and in
the public interest (an existing common law defense) or that
even if it was false that "publication was reasonable in all the

circumstances. "91
Finally, it may be argued that the right to dignity provides a
basis for claiming access to a minimal amount of socio-economic
resources, at least adequate to ensure a dignified existence. In
Germany this claim has been sustained in the case of
institutionalized persons. While the German court has reasoned
that the Basic Law "imposes an obligation on the state to ensure
at lease minimal living conditions for every individual," it was in
the case of a prison cell being repeatedly flooded with feces from
a blocked waste pipe that the court held that: "it is a duty of all
state authority to respect and protect human dignity ... [which]
means that the fundamental prerequisites of the individual and
social human existence must be guaranteed for the prisoner
while in prison. '92 Although this is possibly the weakest area of
specific dignity jurisprudence, it offers the largest scope for
further development. While the South African Constitutional
Court has relied directly on the socio-economic rights explicitly
guaranteed in the 1996 Constitution to demand changes in
government housing policy and most recently, to require the
distribution of a particular drug to prevent Mother-to-ChildTransmission of HIV/AIDS in public hospitals, the constitutional
value of human dignity will remain an important value
89. Id.
21, 25.
90. Id.
27-28.
91. Id.
44.
92. MICHALOWSKu & WOODS, supra note 31, at 104 (citing BVerfG NJW 1993, 3190
[Prison Living Conditions Case]).
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underpinning this jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION

WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR MONTANA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE?

In conclusion, I wish to point out a number of ways in which
this comparative jurisprudence may interact with any future
development of the Montana dignity clause. Given the paucity
of U.S. jurisprudence on an explicit right to dignity and the
Montana clause's roots in the Puerto Rican Constitution of 1952,
it seems only reasonable for the Montana Supreme Court to
consider comparative experiences. This will, however, also bring
some inherent limitations. As is clear from the brief sketch of
dignity jurisprudence above, many of the interpretations in
Germany and South Africa are premised on particular legal
forms inherent to those countries' legal systems. At the same
time, it is also clear that foreign jurisdictions have drawn on
earlier discussions of dignity in the U.S. Supreme Court and
applied these ideas in contexts from which the U.S. Court has
itself shied. Of course, it is also important to consider the
particular impact of federalism and the supremacy of the U.S.
Constitution when thinking about those cases in which a right
to dignity has helped to transform other rights, especially in the
area of freedom of expression. Despite these complexities, I
believe that Montana may be able to profitably mine foreign
dignity jurisprudence in its efforts to define the content and
scope of its own clause.
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